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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
MIRKO DI GIACOMANTONIO and 
ROSA INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SANDRO ROMAGNOLI, ET AL., 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
~ ) Civil Action File No. : 2007CV133477 
) 
) 
~ ) 
-------------------------) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
for Specific Performance, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The parties asked the Court to rule on the briefs they filed in connection with these 
motions, and so the hearing of their oral arguments scheduled for February 29, 
2008, was cancelled. The Court has read the briefs submitted by the parties and 
rules as follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties were owners of a chain of five Figo restaurants in the Atlanta area 
from 2002 until 2007 when the events giving rise to this law suit occurred. They 
conducted their business through several interrelated limited liability corporations. 
Plaintiff Mirko Di Giacomantonio generally conducted business through his 
company, Plaintiff Rosa, Inc. Hereinafter the Plaintiffs will be designated as Di 
Giacomantonio unless otherwise specified. Defendant Sandro Romagnoli conducted 
business through his company, Defendant The Emilio Civeli Group, Inc. These 
Defendants will be referred to hereafter as Romagnoli unless otherwise specified. 
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Defendant Irven B. Penn conducted business through his companies, Defendants LJ 
Hooker Corporation (Worldwide), Inc. and IB Penn, Ltd. These Defendants will be 
designated as Penn hereinafter unless otherwise noted. 
Figo Pasta, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company, was organized in 2002 to 
own and operate Figo Pasta on Collier Road, the first Figo restaurant. Pursuant to the 
company's operating agreement, Di Giacomantonio and Romagnoli each owned 50% of 
this company. In 2003 and 2004, the operating agreement was amended, both times 
granting an ownership interest but not voting rights to Penn. 
In January 2003, Certo, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company ("Certo"), was 
created to own and operate Osteria Del Figo restaurant on Howell Mill Road, the 
second Figo restaurant. The operating agreement governing this company was 
amended one year later. The operating agreement and the amendment to it specified 
various percentages of ownership by the parties. Voting rights for this company were 
50% for Di Giacomantonio, 50% for Romagnoli, and 0% for Penn. 
Spiga, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company ("Spiga"), was created in May 
2003 to operate the Figo central kitchen commissary. Again, the parties had varying 
percentages of ownership pursuant to the operating agreement for Spiga, and its 
amendment the following year, but voting rights remained equally divided between Di 
Giacomantonio and Romagnoli. 
Pursuant to the terms of a loan agreement, Di Giacomantonio's interest in Certo 
and Spiga was bought out by Defendants in 2004. Defendants thereafter formed three 
additional LLCs to construct and own three more Figo restaurants (numbers 3, 4, and 5) 
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in which Plaintiffs had no interest. There are no issues with regard to any of the 
aforementioned agreements among the parties. 
In early 2007, the parties entered into several new operating agreements 
creating three holding companies to own all five of the Figo restaurants and the central 
commissary. These agreements form the basis of this law suit, and are referred to 
hereafter as the restructuring agreements. Plaintiffs contend that the restructuring 
agreements are unenforceable because of Defendants' tortious actions, while 
Defendants contend that they are enforceable. Defendants move the Court to order 
specific performance of the restructuring agreements by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs move 
for partial summary judgment, contending that there are no issues of fact with regard to 
whether an event triggering Plaintiffs' involuntary withdrawal from ownership of the Figo 
entities has occurred. 
Both of these motions raise the issue of whether any basis exists for the 
involuntary withdrawal provision of the restructuring agreements to apply. While the 
Complaint alleges fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breaches of fiduciary duty and 
conspiracy, all of which if proved would void the contracts, Plaintiffs argue that, even if 
the Court finds the restructuring agreements to be enforceable, no involuntary 
withdrawal events occurred, and thus, Defendants had no basis to force Di 
Giacomantonio's withdrawal from the enterprise. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As all parties appear to agree, the restructuring agreements at issue in this case 
were signed by the parties after a certain amount of negotiations and review. Thus, the 
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restructuring agreements are enforceable, as a matter of law, unless Plaintiffs can 
successfully establish a defense or challenge to the contracts. 
The facts show that Di Giacomantonio had adequate time to read and review the 
restructuring agreements he signed in 2007, and that he consulted his attorney before 
he signed them. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no issues of fact with regard 
to Di Giacomantonio's allegations that he didn't understand the restructuring contracts. 
See Hovendick v. Presidential Fin. Corp .. 230 Ga. App. 502 (1998) 
Di Giacomantonio also argues that he was fraudulently induced to sign the 
restructuring agreements because Defendants owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose 
material terms (Le., the effect of the involuntary withdrawal provisions). The party 
asserting a confidential relationship bears the burden of establishing it. Parello v. Maio. 
268 Ga. 852, 853 (1998). Confidential relationships can be established by 
demonstrating a contractual, statutory or fiduciary duty to act in a certain manner. 
Neither Section 5.4 of the restructuring agreements, nor C.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 obligates 
Defendants to provide such information to Di Giacomantonio. Plaintiff, therefore, failed 
to establish the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to prevail on his claim 
that he was fraudulently induced to sign the restructuring agreements. See Parello v. 
Maio. 268 Ga. 852 (1998); Ledford v. Smith. 274 Ga. App. 714 (2005); Hovendick v. 
Presidential Fin. Corp .. 230 Ga. App. 502 (1998). 
The restructuring agreements described events that, if they occurred, would force 
Di Giacomantonio's involuntary withdrawal from ownership in the various holding 
companies at issue. In general, these events have to do with potential claims of interest 
in the Figo entities caused by the divorce of any of the owners, and certain behaviors by 
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the owners. Romagnoli and Penn contend that at least one of these events has 
occurred, and seek summary judgment ordering Di Giacomantonio's specific 
performance of the restructuring agreements by his involuntary withdrawal from 
ownership in the LLCs involved. Di Giacomantonio seeks summary judgment in his 
favor as to whether any event triggering his involuntary withdrawal from the several 
LLCs involved in the restructuring agreements has occurred. The heart of the parties' 
dispute revolves around the meaning of the phrase "if ... a final order of a court in a 
divorce proceeding ... is entered .... " (emphasis added). 
Contract construction is a matter of law. Glisson v. IRHA of Loganville, 
Inc., _ S.E.2d _, 2008 WL204624 *1 (Jan. 25, 2008). First, a court must 
determine whether the contract is clear or ambiguous. If a court finds that an 
ambiguity exists, then the rules of contract construction found in D.C.G.A. §§ 13-
2-2 and 13-2-3 are applied to resolve the ambiguity. These construction rules 
include ascertaining the intent of the parties, giving words their plain meaning, 
and construing the contract to uphold it in whole. D.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2, 13-2-3. If, 
after applying these rules, the ambiguity is not resolved, then the question of 
interpretation is one of fact not appropriate for determination on summary 
judgment. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., v. Imaging Systems Internat'l, 273 
Ga. 525, 526 (2001). 
The Court finds that whether the involuntary withdrawal provision 
language "is entered" is retrospective or prospective is an ambiguity and thus will 
apply the rules of contract construction. The language of other involuntary 
withdrawal triggering provisions focus on future events with phrases such as 
5 
"makes an assignment" and "ceases to perform." The Court, however, is 
sensitive to the need for LLC members to protect their investment by shielding 
themselves from the unwanted transfer of shares and is cautious in reading a 
strict temporal requirement (future actions only) into this provision. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendants, however, acknowledge that the purpose of the 
restructuring agreements, in part, was to grant ownership interests to Di Giacomantonio. 
In addition, all of the parties were aware of the 2003 divorce settlement in question. To 
interpret the provision as Defendants request would create an illogical result and render 
the provisions granting Di Giacomantonio ownership interests without meaning. 
Therefore, consistent with O.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2 and 13-2-3, the Court finds thatthe 
involuntary withdrawal provision is prospective and therefore not triggered by Di 
Giacomantonio's 2003 divorce settlement. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for Specific Performance is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: their Motion for the specific performance 
of involuntary withdrawal is hereby DENIED; however, to the extent that they seek 
summary judgment that the restructuring agreements are valid and enforceable, implicit 
in the motion for specific performance, their Motion is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this 1"3 day of March, 2008. 
41l LL-1'J. Pov ~ 
ALICE D. BONNER, JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
6 
Copies to: 
John M. Gross, Esq. 
John J. Richard, Esq. 
Ramsey Knowles, Esq. 
TAYLOR BUSCH SLiPAKOFF & DUMA LLP 
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200 
Atlanta, Georgia 30339 
Walter H. Bush, Esq. 
Tammy A. Bouchelle, Esq. 
Christopher B. Freeman, Esq. 
SCHIFF HARDIN LLP 
One Atlantic Center, Suite 2300 
1201 West Peachtree Street, NE 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
7 
